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THE BURNSIDE DOCTRINE: DEVELOPMENT
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act'
(LHWCA) provides a system of worker's compensation for persons
qualifying as maritime employees under the Act.2 Benefits to injured
workers or their survivors are paid by the employer or his insurer. 3 When
a third party is at fault in causing an injury to a covered employee, the
LHWCA provides that the compensation liability of the insurer is reduced
by the amount recovered by the injured employee or his survivors'
in a tort action against the third-party tortfeasor.1 If the injured employee
or his survivors do not file this tort suit against the third-party tortfeasor
within six months after receiving compensation "under an award," 6 the
acceptance of compensation acts as an assignment of the employee's or
survivors' right to recover damages against the third person in favor of
the employer.7 Additionally, the jurisprudence has established that the
employer is entitled to be reimbursed out of the employee's tort recovery
for compensation benefits paid, regardless of whether the compensation
was paid under an award.' This result remains even if the employer is
concurrently negligent,9 and the employer may recover all of the compen-
sation paid by him to the employee despite the fact that the employee
Copyright 1984, by LoutSIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-952 (1976).
2. For an injury to be compensable, the LHWCA requires that the worker have the
"status" of a covered employee, as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976). In addition, the
injury must have occurred on a covered "situs" as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
3. An employer who secures the payment of compensation to his employees is not
liable in tort to an injured employee or to that employee's representative. 33 U.S.C. §§
904-905 (1976). The terms "employer" and "insurer" are used interchangeably in this note
since the remedies discussed herein relate to 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976), which provides in
subsection (h): "Where the employer is insured and the insurance carrier has assumed the
payment of the compensation, the insurance carrier shall be subrogated to all the rights
of the employer under this section."
4. In case of the covered employee's death following the injury, whether or not the
death is the result of the injury, certain members of the employee's family are entitled
to collect LHWCA benefits. 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(d), 909 (1976).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 933(0 (1976).
6. The definition of the words "under an award" has generated a great deal of litiga-
tion and is generally beyond the scope of this note. Basically the issue is whether a certain
event constitutes an "award" so as to trigger the six-month period for an assignment. See
generally Pallas Shipping Agency v. Duris, 103 S. Ct. 1991 (1983).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976). The assignment can also work to the benefit of the
insurer through 33 U.S.C. § 933(h) (1976).
8. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943).
9. In Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), the court stated that "the stevedore-employer, even though
concurrently negligent, has a right to reimbursement for its expenditures made under the
Act regardless of whether it has paid the compensation under an award or has paid the
amount without such an award." Id. at 674.
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bears the full burden of paying the expenses for the action against the
third-party tortfeasor.1°
These sections of the LHWCA and the jurisprudentially created
remedies protect the insurer for that portion of compensation benefits
paid or payable to the injured employee which does not exceed the liability
of the tortfeasor. However, situations arise where the benefits paid to
the injured employee or his survivors exceed the amount which the
employee or his survivors could recover in a tort action against the tort-
feasor. For example, state law may limit the amount of damages available
in the employee's or survivors' tort action," or the injured employee may
be of such an age that his claim for lost wages is small, while the insurer
would be liable for lifetime benefits to the employee or his survivors.' 2
In such situations, the subrogation and assignment remedies listed above
by which the insurer can reduce his compensation liability or recoup some
of the benefits paid out will not be sufficient for the insurer to be made
whole.
Development of the Burnside Doctrine
Assignment and subrogation are not the only means by which the
insurer may recover. In Federal Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping
Co.,' 3 the United States Supreme Court held that the statutory assign-
ment remedy in section 933 of the LHWCA"' is not the exclusive remedy
of the employer. A stevedore's employee, who was covered under the
LHWCA, was killed while working on board a ship. Both the decedent's
widow and the decedent's employer sued the shipowner, the widow seek-
ing wrongful death recovery and the employer seeking reimbursement for
past and future compensation payments." The state wrongful death statute
limited recovery to $30,000, as against a compensation liability which might
total $70,000. The Court considered two issues: (1) whether section 933
10. See Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980). It is questionable whether
this same result is reached when the employer's tort recovery is not large enough to cover
both the attorney fees and the compensation lien of the employer. The Bloomer court did
not face this issue, and there is a conflict among the circuits. Compare Ochoa v. Employer's
Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 82-3618 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1984) (reasonable attorney fees must be
deducted from the employee's recovery before the insurer's lien can be satisfied) and Incor-
vaia v. Hellenic Lines, 668 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982) (reasonable
attorney fee has priority) with Johnson v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 629
F.2d 1244 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980) (compensation lien has priority).
11. See, e.g., Federal Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969)
(state law limited the wrongful death recovery to $30,000, while the compensation liability
might total $70,000).
12. See, e.g., Hinson v. SS Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (66-year-old victim).
13. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
15. The employer's claim was asserted in its counterclaim to an indemnification claim
by the shipowner.
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was the exclusive remedy available to an employer attempting to recover
compensation benefits paid or payable to his employee injured by a third
party, and (2) if section 933 is not the exclusive remedy, whether the third
party (there, a shipowner) owed the employer (there, a stevedore) any
duty giving rise to a cause of action in favor of the employer. The Court
held that section 933 of the Act did not preclude a direct action by the
employer against a third-party tortfeasor, noting that "the legislative grant
of a new right does not ordinarily cut off or preclude other nonstatutory
rights in the absence of clear language to that effect."" Furthermore,
the Court concluded that federal maritime law does impose upon a
shipowner a duty of due care to a stevedoring contractor, and does
recognize a direct action in tort in favor of the stevedore against the
shipowner to recover the amount of compensation benefits payable as a
result of the shipowner's negligence.' 7 Thus, the Court not only removed
any bar to an independent cause of action on behalf of the employer,
but also provided the employer with that independent cause of action.
The cause of action recognized in Burnside is a federal cause of action
since, in that case, federal law provided the rule of decision in the vic-
tim's tort suit against the tortfeasor. The compensation liability of the
employer is a federal liability under the LHWCA, but the tort action be-
tween the victim or the employer and the third-party tortfeasor may be
either a state or federal cause of action. Therefore, if a court determines
that state law applies, the employer must allege an appropriate state law
cause of action.
In Louviere v. Shell Oil Co.,' 8 the plaintiff was injured in the explo-
sion of a water heater on an offshore oil rig attached to the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf ninety miles off the Louisiana coast.' 9 The plaintiff was
employed by Movible Offshore (Movible), a drilling contractor who owned
the drilling rig.2" Movible's insurer, Argonaut Insurance Co. (Argonaut),
paid LHWCA benefits to the plaintiff.' Argonaut filed suit against the
platform owner, Shell Oil Co. (Shell), asserting an independent cause of
action against Shell for compensation benefits paid or payable to the vic-
16. 394 U.S. at 412.
17. Id. at 416-17.
18. 509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
19. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1983) (a case arising from
the same accident).
20. Id.
21. The plaintiff was covered under the LHWCA through the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp.
V 1981) states:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury
occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf
for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline
the natural resources . . . of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf, compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the [LHWCA].
19841 llll
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
tim. Argonaut's suit was filed one day before the prescriptive period
elapsed. The victim filed suit against Shell some two years later, while
Argonaut's suit was still pending. The defendant Shell pleaded prescrip-
tion to the victim's suit, arguing that Argonaut's suit did not interrupt
prescription since Argonaut's suit was barred by section 933 of the
LHWCA.
The first issue was whether state or federal law should apply to the
case.22 Since the accident occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf, the
Fifth Circuit looked to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
which provides:
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with
this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the
Secretary . . ., the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State
. . . are declared to be the law of the United States for that por-
tion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,
and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which
would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental
Shelf .... 23
Thus, state law was applicable in Louviere because the cause of action
arose on a fixed oil rig on the Outer Continental Shelf. Under the OCSLA,
state law is applicable in fact situations such as that present in Louviere,
not of its own force as state law, but rather as statutorily adopted federal
law. The courts have implied that "federal law" in this context means
federal statutory law, as opposed to federal common law.2
Since state law applied to Argonaut's action, it was necessary to find
a state cause of action. Although the court cited Burnside in concluding
that section 933 did not bar an independent suit by the employer, that
part of Burnside which provided a federal cause of action did not apply
to Argonaut's claim which was governed by state law. The court held
that Argonaut's claim stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment under
Louisiana law, reasoning that Argonaut had specifically alleged that the
fault of the defendants injured the employee whom Argonaut then became
obligated to and did in fact compensate. Thus, the court reasoned that
the tortfeasors were unjustly enriched at Argonaut's expense. Louviere,
therefore, followed Burnside in holding that section 933 was not a bar
22. 509 F.2d at 281 n.4.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
24. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court stated that "Congress
made clear provision for filling in the 'gaps' in federal law; it did not intend that federal
courts fill in those 'gaps' themselves by creating new federal common law." Id. at 104-05
(footnote omitted).
25. 509 F.2d at 285.
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to an independent cause of action by the employer, and it established
one such independent cause of action under Louisiana law.
If the Louviere court's rationale is accepted, any Louisiana employer
or insurer faced with a LHWCA compensation liability which exceeds the
amount which the employee or his representative could have recovered
in a direct action against the tortfeasor would seemingly have access to
a Burnside-type action. However, the "enrichment" found by the court
in Louviere arguably will not exist in most situations. The court found
a benefit to the tortfeasor from the tortfeasor's transfer of the compen-
sation burden to the employer. However, were it not for the unjust enrich-
ment cause of action found by the court, the compensation burden would
not be on the tortfeasor in the first place. The court has used the result
of its reasoning as the foundation for that same reasoning. Thus, the
vitality of the Louviere cause of action is questionable.26
Having found that section 933 does not limit the insurer to the assign-
ment and subrogation remedies and having found an appropriate state
tort law cause of action, the only remaining issue after Louviere was
whether the liability of the third-party tortfeasor under the state law cause
of action is limited to the amount which might be recovered in a direct
action by the victim. This question was answered in the recent case of
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,"7 which arose from the same water heater explo-
sion as that in Louviere. One man injured in the explosion and the widows
of two other men killed in the explosion each filed suit against the plat-
form owner, Shell. Argonaut, who had paid LHWCA benefits to the in-
jured men and the survivors of those killed in the accident, intervened
in the suits seeking subrogation for the amount of compensation paid
to the victims. Argonaut also filed its own suit against Shell for recovery
of past compensation payments and future compensation liability. All of
the suits were consolidated for trial. The trial court held the platform
owner liable to the injured man and the widows and ordered Shell to
respond in damages. Differing amounts of the awards were to be paid
to Argonaut as reimbursement for compensation benefits paid to the in-
jured man and the widows. The amount of compensation paid by
Argonaut to widow Olsen exceeded her tort recovery, so her entire award
was paid over to Argonaut.
26. In other words, the Louviere court held that the tortfeasor is unjustly enriched
by the transfer of the burden of compensating the injured employee from the tortfeasor
to the employer, and to remedy this unjust enrichment, the court placed the burden of
compensation on the tortfeasor. Prior to Louviere, the burden of compensating the injured
employee has always rested on the employer's shoulders. Therefore, the Louviere court found
an unjust enrichment of the tortfeasor in the tortfeasor's transfer of an obligation which,
but for the finding of the unjust enrichment, the tortfeasor would not have had in the
first place. The logic is clearly circuitous, relying on its conclusion as a foundation for
its reasoning.
27. 708 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Argonaut's recovery of payments made to Olsen thus presented the
situation previously mentioned since the section 933 assignment or subroga-
tion remedies would not provide the insurer with full recovery because
the amount of compensation paid or payable exceeded the liability of the
third-party tortfeasor. The court noted that the district court had awarded
Olsen's widow only $16,000 because she had been divorced from the dece-
dent at the time the accident occurred and had been receiving little sup-
port or comfort from him.28 Argonaut's liability for compensation to the
Olsen family, however, was much greater than this amount. Thus, were
Argonaut limited to recovering what widow Olsen could recover from the
tortfeasor, it would be limited to a $16,000 recovery against a much larger
compensation liability. The district court did not so limit the insurer,
however, and ordered Shell to reimburse Argonaut for all compensation
benefits paid and those payable in the future.29
On appeal, Shell argued that its liability should be limited to the
amount which could be awarded in "direct" tort damages; that is, the
amount which could be awarded to the victims of the tort. The basis
of the defendant's argument was that "the LHWCA contemplates one
damage award against a culpable third person and limits that award to
the amount the employee or his representative would be entitled to recover
under applicable tort law." 3 Shell further argued that the inclusion in
the LHWCA of a statutory assignment remedy, the only remedy for the
insurer available in the statute, implies a limitation on the amount of
any recovery by an insurer against a third-party tortfeasor. Therefore,
even though a separate cause of action is available to the insurer, the
liability of the tortfeasor is limited to the amount which the victims or
their survivors could recover in a tort suit.
The Fifth Circuit chose to rely on the unjust enrichment cause of
action created in Louviere, despite the problems with that theory of
recovery." Citing Burnside, the court held that the LHWCA, particularly
section 933, does not limit the amount of recovery from a tortfeasor of
benefits paid or payable by an employer or insurer to that amount which
the victims or their representatives are able to recover. The holding and
the reliance on Burnside seem correct. Since the court treated the cause
of action as a state law cause of action, Burnside would seem only im-
portant insofar as it held that section 933 is not the exclusive remedy
for the employer and does not limit the amount of damages available
28. Id. at 981 n.4.
29. The court also held that the plaintiff's employer, Teledyne Movible Offshore, was
to indemnify Shell.
30. Olsen, 708 F.2d at 980.
31. Since the same accident was involved in Olsen and Louviere, the Olsen panel was
perhaps hesitant to differ from the arguably incorrect interpretation of state law reached
by the Louviere panel.
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to those recoverable by the employer via section 933 or the judicially
created subrogation remedy. Interestingly, the court in Olsen cites Burn-
side only for the question of whether the tortfeasor's liability in an in-
dependent tort action by the insurer is limited to that amount recoverable
in a direct action by the victim or his representative. In Burnside, the
court never specifically stated that section 933 did not limit the amount
of damages available, but since the court recognized that section 933 did
not bar an independent action by the employer, the concomitant freedom
of the damages amount from the limitations of section 933 may be
implied.2
The LHWCA was substantially amended in 197211 after the Supreme
Court's decision in Burnside. One of the amended sections3" provides that
if the employee's injury was caused by "vessel negligence," the employee
can recover directly against that "vessel." 3 This section was intended to
abolish the Sieracki6 doctrine; which had allowed a longshoreman "doing
a seaman's work"37 to recover from the vessel upon which he was work-
ing for injuries caused by an unseaworthy condition. The amendment limits
the longshoreman to an action for negligence.38 This amended section also
provides that this new remedy for the employee is exclusive of all other
remedies against the vessel except other remedies available under the Act. 9
One district court has held that this amendment had the effect of
abrogating Burnside, and consequently, the court limited the insurer's
recovery of past and future compensation benefits to that amount which
would have been recoverable by the victim's representatives."0 The tort-
32. The Olsen panel cites the following language from Burnside: "[W]e can perceive
no reason why Congress would have intended so to curtail the stevedoring contractor's rights
against the shipowner." Burnside, 394 U.S. at 413, quoted in Olsen, 708 F.2d at 981.
Arguably, once the Burnside court determined that a separate cause of action was available,
it was taken for granted that the amount of damages available in such an action would
not be tied to the amount of damages available in a direct action by the victim's survivors.
The cited language seems to have dealt more with the question of whether section 933 was
a bar to the separate cause of action than with the question of whether damages are limited
to those available in the direct action.
33. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (1976) provides the definition of "vessel" for the purposes
of the LHWCA.
36. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
37. Id. at 99.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4698, 4701-05.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
40. Hinson v. SS Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1978). The court concluded:
[T]he Amended Act as a whole, and § 905(b) in particular, has modified Burn-
side to the extent that employers or their compensation insurance carriers are limited
to the recovery of compensation benefits paid, as provided in § 933, and that
1984]
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feasor in that case was a vessel. In Olsen, the court correctly decided
that since a vessel was not involved, this amendment, "[w]hatever its
meaning," 4 ' could have no application."
Since Burnside was decided in 1969, it has been something of a "sleep-
ing giant," applied only infrequently by the federal courts. One of the
more widely cited applications of Burnside is Landon v. Lief Hoegh &
Co.'4 In Landon, the court held that in a tort action by the victim against
the third-party tortfeasor, the employer was neither a necessary nor in-
dispensable party. The tortfeasor argued that because the employer had
a cause of action under Burnside, he could be joined as a proper party
plaintiff. The court also noted that "[the employer's] Burnside claim for
relief would only become a practical remedy if it still exists, after it is
determined that the compensation payments exceed the plaintiff's
recovery."" Thus, the court reasoned that the employer might never have
a cause of action against the tortfeasor, and complete relief could be had
between the employee and the tortfeasor without the employer's presence.
In Burnside, the Supreme Court recognized that the duties owed to
the stevedore-employer differ from those owed to the longshoreman-
employee, so the judicial economy to be gained by determining the two
causes of action in the same proceeding would seem marginal." The Lan-
don court's belief that the independent action could only be brought after
in no instance can they recover more than the injured worker or his beneficiaries.
Id. at 223. The court also felt that the recovery of future compensation benefits would
be too speculative.
41. Olsen, 708 F.2d at 982.
42. The Ninth Circuit has considered this issue. In Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co.
v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 696 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1983), the court, in concluding that
the 1972 amendments have no effect on Burnside even in those cases involving a vessel
tortfeasor, noted that "[tihe legislative history of the 1972 amendments shows that Con-
gress intended the elimination of the Ryan [Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956)] and Sieracki type of causes of action. However, no mention was made
of the Burnside type of a cause of action." Id. at 706.
To be completely accurate, one must recall that Burnside yielded two conclusions: (l)
section 933 is not the employer's exclusive remedy against the tortfeasor, and (2) federal
law imposes a duty upon the shipowner in favor of the stevedore employer. To speak of
"the Burnside type of cause of action" directs attention at the latter conclusion of Burn-
side, while it is in fact the continuing validity of the former conclusion which is at issue.
Had the Olsen or Crescent Wharf court concluded, as did the district court in Hinson v.
S.S. Paros, 461 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1978), discussed supra note 40 and accompanying
text, that the LHWCA amendments modified Burnside's holding and made section 933 the
employer's exclusive remedy, it would have been unnecessary to consider whether federal
law (or state law, for that matter) provides the employer with a cause of action. The existence
of a duty owed to the employer, for example, is irrelevant if the employer has no access
to a remedy due to the exclusivity of section 933.
43. 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
44. Id. at 761.
45. In Burnside, the Court noted: "We do not, of course, hold that the shipowner's
duty to the employer is the same as to the employee." 394 U.S. at 415.
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tort damages to the employee were fixed, while not expressly supported
by Burnside, makes sense. The cause of action necessarily only exists when
the employer is damaged, and the employer is only damaged when the
compensation liability exceeds the tort recovery of the victim.
Unresolved Issues of the Burnside Doctrine
Application of the Burnside doctrine presents several problems as yet
not considered by the courts. As previously noted, the existence of an
independent action by the LHWCA insurer or the employer of an employee
injured by the fault of some third party should be required only infre-
quently. Specifically, such an action is only necessary when the compen-
sation liability exceeds the amount which the employee or his represen-
tative could have recovered in a direct tort action against the tortfeasor.
One problem which exists when state law is to apply to the indepen-
dent action by the insurer is the existence of an appropriate cause of action
under Louisiana law. Given the apparent weakness of the Louviere cause
of action for unjust enrichment, another theory of recovery will probably
be required. The cause of action established in Burnside stems from a
federally recognized duty, but perhaps such a duty (from a third party
to the party responsible for the payment of workmen's compensation
benefits) exists as a matter of state law. Alternatively, one commentator
has suggested that the cause of action used in Burnside may be most closely
related to a cause of action for negligent interference with contract. ' 6 It
appears that such a cause of action is not recognized under Louisiana
law."7 In order to apply Burnside to those situations in which state law
will provide the rule of decision, courts will be required either to con-
tinue to follow Louviere or to fashion a new cause of action based on
Burnside or upon some other theory.
It appears that in the future the state courts may have more oppor-
tunities to address this issue for themselves. Recently, in Lowe v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding,"8 the Fifth Circuit discussed the jurisdictional requirements
for bringing a Burnside-type action in federal court. The plaintiffs, injured
employees of the defendant, had reached a settlement with a third-party
tortfeasor which was conditioned by agreement upon the third party's
freedom from liability to the employer. The employees sought a declaratory
judgment that
46. Maraist, Current Developments of Interest-LHWCA: Employer's Recovery Against
Tortfeasor, I FIFn CIR. REP. 19, 19 (Oct. 12, 1983).
47. See PPG Industries v. Bean Dredging, No. 82-C-2201, slip op. at 6 (La. Feb. 27,
1984) ("It is highly unlikely that the moral, social and economic considerations underlying
the imposition of a duty not to negligently injure property encompass the risk that a third
party who has contracted with the owner of the injured property will thereby suffer an
economic loss.").
48. No. 82-4361, slip op. (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 1984).
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the LHWCA, especially its 1972 amendments, restricts [the
employer] to the Act's subrogation rights, that [the employer]
accordingly has no independent or Burnside type indemnity ac-
tion, and that, if the LHWCA does not so restrict [the employer's]
rights, any independent rights [the employer] might have would
arise under state law, and that under the law of the relevant state,
Mississippi, [the employer] has no such rights. 9
The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under either
diversity of citizenship grounds 0 or under admiralty jurisdiction." Con-
sidering federal question jurisdiction,52 the court found that the issue of
the 1972 amendments' effect on Burnside was a "defensive issue which
cannot form the basis of section 1331 jurisdiction." 3 The court noted
that the Burnside cause of action is independent, by definition, from the
LHWCA; thus, it could not arise under the LHWCA. Finally, the court
rejected the argument that federal question jurisdiction was supported by
the fact that the employer's obligation to pay compensation was one arising
under federal law." The court thus held that it would not have subject
matter jurisdiction if this claim were brought by the employer, and that
therefore it had no jurisdiction over the declaratory action brought by
the employees."
Another potential problem is the effect of an employee's contributory
negligence. Unless the injury to the covered employee was caused solely
by his intoxication or by his willful intent to injure or kill either himself
or another, 0 he is entitled to compensation regardless of his fault.
However, the employee's tort recovery in his direct action against a
negligent third party would be reduced or eliminated, depending upon
the jurisdiction, by his contributory negligence. Suppose, for example,
an employee was ninety percent contributorily negligent in causing his own
49. Id. at 1798-99.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976).
51. Id. § 1333(1).
52. Id. § 1331.
53. No. 82-4361, slip op. at 1806 (footnote omitted).
54. "In these circumstances, this relationship between the LHWCA and [the employer's)
questioned Burnside cause of action is too indirect, collateral and remote for the Burnside
cause of action to be considered as one 'arising under' the LHWCA for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction." Id. at 1809 n.10.
55. Given the federally recognized goal of conservation of the employer's resources
for compensation, see Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980), one might
argue that federal factfinding might better be used in this LHWCA-related Burnside situa-
tion. One author has suggested that a broader inquiry as to the applicability of federal
question jurisdiction might be made, at least when there is a "debatable issue" as to federal
question jurisdiction. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 96 (4th ed.
1983). Such an inquiry should include the desirability of having the federal courts decide
the Burnside-related issues; a question not addressed by the court in Lowe.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1976).
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injury. The potential tort liability of the third-party tortfeasor would be
reduced by ninety percent or eliminated, depending upon the jurisdiction.
However, the full amount of compensation would still be payable to the
employee or his survivor. As between the tortfeasor and the employer,
who should bear the burden of compensating the employee for his in-
juries caused in part by the employee's own negligence? Arguably, one
of the risks which has been statutorily placed upon the employer is the
risk that the employee might negligently cause, in whole or in part, his
own injury. This can be seen in the section 903(b)57 exclusion for a specific
type of employee behavior, perhaps implying that the employer is respon-
sible for compensation burdens caused by other types of employee fault.
On the other hand, as between the employer and the tortfeasor, the tort-
feasor is the only one directly at fault; the employer is blameless.
Resolution of this problem may well depend upon whether the courts
are willing to impute the negligence of the employee to the employer.
One commentator has suggested that the employee's negligence should
not be imputed since the concept of imputed contributory negligence is
fading 8 and since the cases have held that when the employer and the
tortfeasor are concurrently negligent, the tortfeasor is to bear the entire
burden of damages as to the employee.59 Such holdings imply an unwill-
ingness to hold the employer liable for anything except LHWCA com-
pensation. However, the Burnside cause of action is outside of the
LHWCA statute by definition. Arguably, the better treatment is to deal
with the Burnside plaintiff/employer as any other tort plaintiff" and
disregard the fact that the plaintiff is also an LHWCA employer. Bolstering
this position is the fact that as to the compensation of the longshoreman
or covered employee, it matters not whether the employer's recovery under
Burnside is reduced due to the employee's imputed contributory negligence.
A related problem not yet considered by the courts is whether the
employer's own concurrent negligence, which joins with the negligence
of the third-party tortfeasor to produce the injury to the employee, should
reduce the employer's recovery under a Burnside-type cause of action.
The most common example of this situation occurs due to the employer's
respondeat superior liability for the negligent acts of the victim's co-
workers. Employer fault may not be used to reduce the tort recovery of
the employee from the third-party tortfeasor, 6' and the tortfeasor may
not obtain contribution from the concurrently negligent employer."2 In
57. Id.
58. Maraist, supra note 46, at 20.
59. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
60. This, of course, would not be dispositive of the issue, given the questionable status
of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence.
61. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
62. See Pope &'Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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these situations, the courts have not been willing to allow the employer's
fault to have a potential effect upon the recovery of the employee.63
However, when the employer is suing the third-party tortfeasor to recover
that amount of compensation which exceeds the tort liability of the third
party to the employee, the employee faces no danger of financial loss
and stands to get both his compensation and tort recovery. The employer's
Burnside-type cause of action is wholly independent from the employee's
cause of action in tort. The Burnside-type action is not founded on the
tortfeasor's wrong to the covered employee, but on its "independent
wrong" to the employer." The reason for denying reduction of the
employee's award, or the award to the employer to whom the employee's
action has been statutorily assigned, is at least in part to protect the
employee's right to compensation regardless of fault and tort recovery
to the extent some third party is at fault. When the party who stands
to lose is the employer (who could have avoided this risk by obtaining
insurance) or the insurer (whose business is to spread these risks), the
employer or insurer should arguably be left with that share of the loss
for which the employer was responsible."'
Conversely, one might argue that the protection of the employer's
assets for the payment of compensation claims is a desirable result." Thus,
it is desirable to protect the employer from having to bear the loss of
his own negligence or the negligence of his employee in situations where
some third party is partially at fault in causing the employee's injury.
This goal would be served as well in the employer's independent action
against the tortfeasor as it is in the subrogation and assignment remedies,
where this rule already applies. In other words, the argument would be
that there is an important maritime interest in allowing the employer to
recover all of the compensation payments he makes to his employees
whenever some third party is at fault. 67
63. Reducing the employee's tort recovery as a result of the employer's fault obviously
has a direct adverse effect upon the employee, while allowing the third party to obtain
contribution from the negligent employer would subject the employer to some liability other
than his compensation liability, thus potentially reducing the employer's ability to pay com-
pensation claims.
64. Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 760 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976).
65. Although Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transtlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979),
seems to stand for the proposition that the employer's fault is not to be considered when
determining the rights of the employer as to the third-party tortfeasor, that case would
arguably not apply to the employer's independent cause of action. Furthermore, the ap-
plication of Edmonds to a state law cause of action, such as the one in Olsen, is uncertain.
The Edmonds Court noted: "Of course, our decision does not necessarily have any effect
on situations where the Act provides the workers' compensation scheme but the third-party
action is not governed by principles of maritime law." Id. at 272 n.31.
66. See, e.g., Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980).
67. One implication of such a conclusion is that federal law, rather than state law,
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Against this conclusion, one might argue that by freeing the employer
from any loss in such a situation the employer loses any incentive to
exercise caution to prevent injury to his employees. However, this argu-
ment ignores the fact that the employer's LHWCA insurance rates will
generally respond to claims filed against him, presumably deterring the
employer from careless behavior by the prospect of paying more for his
compensation insurance. Furthermore, the employer can not rely on a
third party being at fault in causing injury to his employees. More often
the injured employee's co-workers are responsible for the employee's in-
jury, thus placing the entire compensation burden on the employer or
his insurer.
In Burnside, the Court stated that its holding assumed that the
stevedore-employer was faultless as to the shipowner-tortfeasor. Prior to
the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, the stevedore-employer was liable
to indemnify the shipowner when the stevedore was found to have breached
its warranty of workmanlike performance.68 In Desiano v. Norddeutscher
Lloyd,69 the district court refused to apply Burnside to a situation where
the employer was concurrently negligent, noting that the stevedore's obliga-
tion to indemnify the shipowner "stems not from any liability imposed
upon it through no fault of its own, but rather from its own breach of
warranty of workmanlike service."" 0 The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
did away with the indemnity obligation of the stevedore to the shipowner
and, thus, arguably renders Desiano of no effect. However, Desiano may
present a situation where the warranty of workmanlike service still exists
even though the right to indemnity has been taken away. The argument
would be that when the employer exercises his independent cause of action
against the tortfeasor, the 1972 amendments should not prevent the tort-
feasor, to whom the warranty is owed, from raising it in defense, at least
for that portion of the employer's recovery over what the employee could
have recovered in a direct action.
Conclusion
Given the infrequency of the fact situations which give rise to a need
for the use of the Burnside doctrine, it is not surprising that the principle
has been used so little and that unresolved problems remain for the courts
to consider. Of particular interest to the Louisiana bar, given the weakness
of the logic used in Louviere, is the fact that the existance of a state
law cause of action using Burnside is not yet certain in Louisiana. If the
should govern the employer's independent Burnside cause of action in all cases, since to
decide otherwise would make the protection of this important maritime interest uncertain.
68. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); supra
note 42.
69. 301 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
70. Id. at 246.
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Louviere court's rationale can be successfully attacked, and if a substitute
theory of recovery cannot be found, those Louisiana employer actions
in which state law provides the rule of decision would be without a bar
in section 933 of the LHWCA and without a cause of action as well.
Also, the problems of allocation of the compensation burden when the
employer or employee is contributorily negligent remain to be addressed.
Before these problems can be resolved in an orderly fashion, the courts
will have to reexamine the policy goals of the LHWCA and make a deter-
mination as to who should bear the ultimate burden for compensation
of an injured employee, the employer or the third party causing the in-
jury.
Karl J. Koch
